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Vanberg, Viktor J. Rules and Choice in Economics. London; New York : Routledge, 1994.
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Table of contents
Abstract
Reviews
Excerpt
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| List of figures | vii |
| Acknowledgements | viii |
| Introduction: Economics as social theory | 1 |
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| Part I. The reason of rules |
| 1. Rules and choice in economics and sociology | 11 |
| 2. Rational choice vs adaptive rule-following: On the behavioural
foundations of the social sciences | 25 |
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| Part II. Rationality and morality |
| 3. Morality and economics: De moribus est disputandum | 41 |
| 4. Rational choice and moral order {with James M. Buchanan) | 60 |
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| Part III. The evolution of rules |
| 5. Spontaneous market order and social rules: A critical examination of F.A.
Hayek's theory of cultural evolution | 77 |
| 6. Hayekian evolutionism - a reconstruction | 95 |
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| Part IV. Rules in markets and organizations |
| 7. Hayek's constitutional political economy | 109 |
| 8. Organizations as constitutional systems | 125 |
| 9. Carl Monger's evolutionary and John R. Commons's collective action approach
to institutions: A comparison | 144 |
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| Part V. Constitutional choice |
| 10. Interests and theories in constitutional choice (with James M.Buchanan)
| 167 |
| 11. Constitutional choice, rational ignorance and the limits of reason (with
James M. Buchanan ) | 178 |
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| Part VI. Legitimacy in constitutional order |
| 12. Liberal evolutionism and contractarian constitutionalism | 195 |
| 13. Individual choice and institutional constraints: The normative element
in classical and contractarian liberalism | 208 |
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| Notes | 235 |
| Bibliography | 293 |
| Index | 305 |
