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Hirschman, Albert O. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004 (1970).
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Table of contents
Abstract
Reviews
Excerpt
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| 1. Introduction and Doctrinal Background | 1 |
| Enter "exit" and "voice" |
| Latitude for deterioration, and slack in economic
thought |
| Exit and voice as impersonations of economics
and politics |
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| 2. Exit | 21 |
| How the exit option works |
| Competition as collusive behavior |
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| 3. Voice | 30 |
| Voice as a residual of exit |
| Voice as an alternative to exit |
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| 4. A Special Difficulty in Combining Exit and Voice | 44 |
| 5. How Monopoly Can be Comforted by Competition | 55 |
| 6. On Spatial Duopoly and the Dynamics of Two-Party Systems | 62 |
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| 7. A Theory of Loyalty | 76 |
| The activation of voice as a function of loyalty |
| Loyalist behavior as modified by severe initiation
and high penalties for exit |
| Loyalty and the difficult exit from public goods
(and evils) |
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| 8.Exit and Voice in American Ideology and Practice | 106 |
| 9. The Elusive Optimal Mix of Exit and Voice | 120 |
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| Appendixes |
| A. A simple diagrammatic representation of voice and exit | 129 |
| B. The choice between voice and exit | 132 |
| C. The reversal phenomenon | 138 |
| D. Consumer reactions to price rise and quality decline in the case of several
connoisseur goods | 141 |
| E. The effects of severity of initiation on activism: design for an experiment
(in collaboration with Philip G. Zimbardo and Mark Snyder) | 146 |
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| Index | 157 |
