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Gourevitch, Peter A. and James Shinn. Political Power and Corporate Control: The New Global Politics
of Corporate Governance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005.
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Оглавление
Аннотация
Рецензии
Текст
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| LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS | vii |
| PREFACE | xiii |
| CHAPTER ONE: Introduction and Summary Argument | 1 |
| Why Fight about Corporate Governance? | 3 |
| Great Variance and the "Great Reversals" | 4 |
| Putting the Pieces Together: In Search of a Political Explanation | 10 |
| Policy Consequences | 12 |
| Plan of Attack | 14 |
| CHAPTER TWO: Governance Patterns: What Causes What? | 15 |
| Outcomes: Dependent Variables and Patterns of Control | 16 |
| Capitalist Economic Policies, Minority Shareholder Protections, and Degrees
of Coordination | 20 |
| Politics: Preferences and Institutions | 22 |
| Conclusion | 26 |
| CHAPTER THREE: Framing Incentives: The Economics and Law Tradition
| 27 |
| Origins of the Debate | 28 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Private Order | 30 |
| Law and Regulation: Minority Shareholder Protections--Information, Oversight,
Control, and Incentives | 39 |
| Varieties of Capitalism: Degrees of Coordination in Market Economies | 51 |
| Conclusion | 55 |
| CHAPTER FOUR: Politics: Preferences and Institutions | 57 |
| Mapping Financial Interests on Political Processes: A Causal Model | 57 |
| Preferences and Coalitions among Owners, Managers, and Workers | 59 |
| Political Institutions: Majoritarian and Consensus Mechanisms | 67 |
| Alternative Arguments: Legal Family and Economic Sociology | 83 |
| Conclusion | 93 |
| CHAPTER FIVE: Preference Cleavages 1: Class Conflict | 95 |
| Section 1: Owners and Managers Dominate Workers | 96 |
| The Investor Model | 96 |
| Analytic Narrative | 123 |
| Korea: Changing Institutions, Shifting Preferences | 123 |
| Section 2: Workers Dominate Owners and Managers | 132 |
| The Labor Power Model | 132 |
| Analytic Narrative | 140 |
| Sweden: The Exemplar of the Labor Power Model? | 140 |
| Conclusion | 147 |
| CHAPTER SIX: Preference Cleavages 2: Sectoral Conflict | 149 |
| Section 1: Cross-Class Coalitions | 149 |
| The Corporatist Model: Workers and Managers Dominate Owners | 150 |
| Analytic Narrative | 159 |
| Germany: From Corporatist Bargain to a Transparency Coalition | 160 |
| Japan: Concentration without Owners | 167 |
| The Netherlands: The Evolution of "Poldermodel" Corporatism | 177 |
| Section 2: Building Coalitions in Authoritarian Systems | 187 |
| The Oligarchy Model: Owners Dominate Workers and Managers | 187 |
| Analytic Narratives | 189 |
| Russia: Oligarchs and Politics | 190 |
| China: "Selectorate-Electorate" Coalition | 192 |
| Singapore: Shareholder Protections with "Guided" Democracy | 199 |
| Conclusion | 203 |
| CHAPTER SEVEN: Preference Cleavages 3: Transparency, Voice, and Pensions
| 205 |
| Section 1: Workers and Owners Dominate Managers | 205 |
| From Class Conflict to Corporatist Compromise | 206 |
| Analytic Narratives | 228 |
| Chile: Authoritarian Roots of the Transparency Coalition | 228 |
| Malaysia: Ethnicity and Democracy in Governance Politics | 232 |
| Section 2: Managers Dominate Owners and Workers | 237 |
| "Managerism" | 237 |
| Analytic Narratives | 241 |
| The United States: A Contested Path from Oligarchy to MSP | 241 |
| United Kingdom: The Power of Majoritarian Political Institutions? | 259 |
| France: Without the State, Who Is in Control? | 262 |
| Conclusion | 273 |
| CHAPTER EIGHT: Conclusion: Going Forward | 277 |
| Questions and Answers: What Explains Variance? | 277 |
| Shortcomings and Guideposts for Future Research | 285 |
| Conclusion: Fighting over the Governance Debate | 287 |
| DATA APPENDIX | 297 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 313 |
| INDEX | 333 |
