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Perrow, Charles. Organizing America: Wealth, Power, and the Origins of Corporate Capitalism. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005.
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Оглавление
Аннотация
Рецензии
Текст
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| Acknowledgments | ix |
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| CHAPTER 1: Introduction | 1 |
| Some Central Concepts | 3 |
| Density and concentration | 3 |
| Size and small-firm networks | 4 |
| Organizations or capitalism | 6 |
| Noneconomic organizations | 7 |
| Power | 8 |
| Culture and other shapers of society | 9 |
| Organizations as the independent variable | 10 |
| What Do Organizations Do? | 12 |
| What Kind of Organizations? | 16 |
| Alternative Theories | 17 |
| Conclusion | 19 |
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| CHAPTER 2: Preparing the Ground | 22 |
| Communities, Markets, Hierarchies, and Networks | 22 |
| Community | 23 |
| The market direction | 25 |
| Toward hierarchy and networks | 28 |
| The Legal Revolution that Launched Organizations | 31 |
| Fear of corporations | 33 |
| What organizations need to be able to do | 35 |
| Making capitalism corporate | 36 |
| Capitalism to Corporate Capitalism | 40 |
| Lawyers: "The Shock Troops of Capitalism" | 43 |
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| CHAPTER 3: Toward Hierarchy: The Mills of Manayunk | 48 |
| Getting the Factory Going: The Role of Labor Control | 48 |
| The first mill-a workhouse | 50 |
| To mechanize or not? | 51 |
| Social Consequences | 53 |
| Labor Policies and Strikes | 58 |
| Organizations and Religion | 60 |
| From Working Classes to a Working Class | 61 |
| The politics of class | 62 |
| Conclusion | 63 |
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| CHAPTER 4: Toward Hierarchy and Networks | 65 |
| Lowell and the Boston Associates | 65 |
| Wage dependence and labor control | 65 |
| Lowell I: The benign phase | 67 |
| Profits and market control | 69 |
| Lowell II: The exploitive phase | 70 |
| Explaining the First Modern Business | 75 |
| Structural constraints | 77 |
| The Slater Model | 79 |
| Toward Networks with the Philadelphia Model | 81 |
| When capital counts | 82 |
| Philadelphia's large mills | 84 |
| Size and technology | 86 |
| Networks of Firms | 88 |
| Labor conflict | 90 |
| Externalities | 90 |
| The Decline of Textile Firms | 92 |
| Summary | 94 |
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| CHAPTER 5: Railroads, the Second Big Business | 96 |
| Railroads in France, Britain, and the United States: The Organizational Logic
| 102 |
| France | 104 |
| Britain | 108 |
| The importance of the railroads | 111 |
| Why Were the Railroads Unregulated and Privatized? | 113 |
| The efficiency argument | 115 |
| Historical institutionalism | 117 |
| Historical institutionalism assessed | 122 |
| The neoinstitutionalist account | 123 |
| The organization interest account | 127 |
| The details | 129 |
| Self-interested opposition to the railroads | 139 |
| Corruption Observed but Not Interpreted | 141 |
| Evidence from the public record, and the outcry | 144 |
| Scholars explain corruption | 151 |
| Summary and Conclusions | 157 |
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| CHAPTER 6: The Organizational Imprinting | 160 |
| Making the Railroads Work | 160 |
| Divisionalization | 161 |
| Finance takes charge | 162 |
| Inevitable, or a chance path? | 165 |
| Contracting out | 166 |
| Leadership Style and Worker Welfare | 173 |
| Work in general | 175 |
| Nationalization and Centralization: The Final Spike | 179 |
| Organizational versus political interpretations | 180 |
| Where did the money come from? | 183 |
| Regionalization versus Nationalization | 186 |
| The debate over the ethos | 187 |
| A political or an organizational interpretation of the struggle? | 192 |
| Was Regionalism Viable? | 194 |
| Concentrating Capital and Power | 196 |
| The corporate form triumphs | 197 |
| Explaining the arrival of the corporate form | 201 |
| An organizational agency account | 204 |
| Summary and Conclusions | 212 |
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| CHAPTER 7: Summary and Conclusions | 217 |
| Appendix Alternative Theories Where Organizations Are the Dependent Variable
| 229 |
| Notes | 237 |
| Bibliography | 243 |
| Index | 251 |
